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Introduction
Decolonization and the emergence of norms of human rights have
had a tremendous impact on the international legal order. On the one
hand, because the traditional international legal order was closely con-
nected with the colonial system, the validity of many traditional rules
and principles has come to be questioned. Emerging norms of human
rights, on the other hand, have been establishing a new framework
within which decision-makers must deal with international problems.
The problem of nationality' upon attainment of independence and
transfer of territory is one of the areas where the validity of traditional
principles is now being questioned.2 Traditionally, the principle of au-
tomatic change of nationality as a consequence of territorial change
governed the relationship between nationality and territorial change.
The main feature of this principle is that when the territory of a state is
acquired by another state, the nationals of the first state who continue
t Assoc. Prof. of International Law, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan. The author
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ble comments and suggestions.
1. In this article, "nationality" is used to designate the legal status of being a member of
a state. Nationality in this sense should, according to modem politico-legal thought, include
political rights, and thus, coincide with the concept of citizenship. As discussed later, this
was not the case for colonial peoples. Nevertheless, the prevailing terminology in interna-
tional law has not questioned the gap between the voluntary and autonomous character of
nationality and its realities.
2. This problem can be understood as one concerning the law of state succession. See,
e.g., Zemanek, State Succession after Decolonization, 116 RECUEIL DES COURS 187 (1965);
D.P. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, pt. 4
(1967); G. BREUNIG, STAATSANGEH65RIGKErr UND ENTKOLONISIERUNG (1974).
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their habitual residence there ("domicile principle") 3 isofacto lose the
former nationality and become nationals of the successor state. This
principle was followed consistently from the seventeenth to the early
twentieth century and was also expressed in international documents. 4
Many influential scholars have regarded this principle as governing the
relationship between nationality and territorial change.5
There has been, however, a minority view in opposition to this ma-
jority view. The minority view stresses the fundamental principle of
international law that questions of nationality are within the domestic
jurisdiction of a state.6 International practice since World War I indi-
cates that problems of nationality accompanying territorial change
have not always been settled with reference to the principle of auto-
matic change. In addition, it is no longer possible to find a straightfor-
ward expression of this principle in contemporary international
instruments.7 Thus, many scholars who recently have undertaken de-
tailed research on this problem have expressed doubts about this prin-
ciple, and argue that nationality problems can be settled only by the
domestic laws of the states involved in the territorial change.8
The above conflict cannot be resolved merely by committing oneself
to one of these views, but rather by clarifying: (1) the substantive and
ideological factors which supported the traditional principle of auto-
matic change;9 (2) the subsequent change in these factors;' 0 and, conse-
3. The term "domicile principle" traditionally has been adopted by scholars to express
this criterion, although domicile does not necessarily coincide with habitual residence.
4. See, eg., Harvard Research Draft on Nationality, art. 18, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPp. 15
(1929).
5. See, eg., 1 & 2 J. KuNz, DIE V6LKERRECHTLICHE OPTION (1925); 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 551 (8th ed. 1955); L BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 638 (2d ed. 1973). For further arguments, see H. JELLINEK, DER AUTO-
MATISCHE ERWERB UND VERLUST DER STAATSANGEHbRIGKEIT DURCH
V6LKERRECHTLICHE VORGXNGE, ZUGLEICH IM BEITRAG ZUR LEHRE VON DER STAATEN-
sUKZESSION 50-59 (1951); G. BREUNIG, supra note 2, at 83-86.
6. See Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law,
Apr. 12, 1930, art. 1, 179 L.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter cited as the Hague Convention]; Advisory
Opinion on the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decrees Case, 1923 P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 4, at
24.
7. See, ag., the very cautious attitude as respects this principle in the reports of M. Hud-
son and R. Cordova to the I.L.C. on "Nationality, including Statelessness." Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 61, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/84 (1954).
8. P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 149, 243-44
(1956); 1 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 2, at 497-528; R. DECOTTIGNIES & M. DE BIEVILLE,
LS NATIONALITES AFRICAINES 44 (1963); J. DE BURLET, NATIONALITA DES PERSONNES
PHYSIQUES ET DtCOLONISATION (1975). See, however, a recent attempt to prolong the life
of the principle byformalizing the concept. G. BREUNIG, supra note 2, at 69-73, 101-23.
9. Before World War I, there were two basic factors supporting this principle. First, the
principle was established in the context of cession of territory among Western European
nations which had a relatively high degree of homogeneity within their territories and could
generally define their nationals in terms of territoriality. Second, the concept of individuals
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quently, (3) the emergency of a new framework" governing nationality
problems that accompany territorial change.
One of the elements of this new framework is the concept of national
self-determination. Because this concept has gained great significance
in the twentieth century, nationality problems have come to be settled
by reference to the criteria for self-determination of a people. Newly
independent countries applied not only the domicile principle, but also
various other criteria in determining who were to be their nationals
according to their own conceptions of the essence of their nations.
These determinations of nationality by the domestic laws of newly in-
dependent countries were basically recognized by former metropolitan
states. Although the principle of automatic change is still important as
a presumptive rule, its underlying rationale differs greatly from that of
the earlier period. The free and voluntary will of individuals who are
to participate in the body politic of the territory should be considered
most important for settling nationality problems.' 2
Another important element of the new framework is the concept of
human rights. Although human rights law has developed in a some-
what different context from that of nationality, it has been implicitly
taken into consideration in settling nationality problems accompanying
territorial change. Prevention of statelessness and respect for the
desires and actual lives of those whose status is affected by the change
of territory or nationality exemplify this concern for human rights.'3 In
addition, the development of human rights law in general, and the
emerging norms of non-discrimination in particular, have gradually
modified the traditional dualistic regime of protection of rights based
as an appurtenance of territory was not questioned during this period. See infra text accom-
panying notes 15-25.
10. Many non-Western European nations that attained independence after World War
II do not have as high a degree of homogeneity as Western European nations had. Thus,
they have had to adopt various criteria other than territorial residence to define their nation-
als. In addition, since World War I, and especially since World War II, politico-legal doc-
trines have emphasized the fate of individuals rather than that of territory. Furthermore, the
relationship between nationality and territorial change has shifted from a situation in which
nitionality is influenced by cession of territory to one in which *nationality is influenced by
independence. Thus, the implicit framework, see infra note 11, treating individuals as an
appurtenance of territory has been rejected. See infra pp. 22-25.
11. In this article, "frame of reference" or "framework" (terms used interchangeably)
signifies a set of criteria, beliefs, and assumptions governing perception, value judgment, and
behavioral decision. A problem is approached, referred to, prescribed, and settled through
and within such a frame of reference. Although frameworks are not, in themselves, rules or
principles of law, they introduce or apply rules or principles, including those of law, which
are required by or relevant to them in the process of dealing with a concrete problem.
12. See infra pp. 25-26.
13. See infra pp. 27-29.
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on the distinction between the concepts of nationals and aliens. 14
Therefore, even when individuals who are affected by territorial change
are not given the nationality of the state in which they live, their rights
as resident aliens should be fully respected.
After describing the development of the traditional principle, this
Article examines the emergence of this new framework through the
prism of nationality settlements following the decolonization of British
and French colonies and other post-war events. Finally, the new
framework is described, with emphasis on its two principal compo-
nents-principles of self-determination and human rights.
I. Historical Analysis of the Principle of Automatic Change of
Nationality
A. Era of "Change of Nationality as a Consequence of Cession of
Territory"
The predominant idea of the relationship between nationality and
territorial change in the European absolutist era was expressed in the
rlgle de Pothier: "when a province is united to the union of the state
[and] when a province is severed from the state;. . . the domination of
the inhabitants changes."' 5 This concept was influenced by the Euro-
pean medieval conception that regarded inhabitants as an appurte-
nance of territory (Pertinenztheorie). When a territory ruled by a
feudal lord was sold, exchanged or devised, according to this appurte-
nance theory, the inhabitants were deemed to be disposed of together
with the territory. 16
Subsequently, diverse and isolated medieval communities were grad-
ually integrated into economically and culturally more homogeneous
national communities under the rule of absolutist monarchs. Because
of the long-lasting and gradual character of the assimilation process
and the predominant power of the monarchs, the national communities
established in this era achieved a relatively high degree of homogeneity
within the territorial unit.17 Therefore, territorial residence could be
14. See infra pp. 29-34.
15. POTHIER, TRAITA DES PERSONNES ET DES CHOSES 18, 9 OEUVRES DE POTHIER (M.
Bugnet ed. 1861). (This and subsequent translations are those of the author, except as
indicated).
16. 1 J. KuNz, supra note 5, at 31-32; E. SZLECHTER, LES OPTIONS CONVENTIONELLES
DE NATIONALITti A LA SUITE DE CESSIONS DE TERRITOIRES, ch. 1 (1948); Onuma, Zainichi-
Chosenjin no Hoteki Chii ni Kansuru Ichikosatsu (Legal Status of Koreans in Japan) 96
HOGAKUKYOKAI ZAssi 529, 531-32 (1979).
17. The separation of "politics" from "religion" (consider the historical significance of
Machiavelli's The Prince, and the logic of politics (symbolized by the famous remark of
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used as the criterion in determining the fate of individuals affected by
territorial change. Thus, the principle of automatic change of sub-
jecthood of the inhabitants accompanying territorial change
prevailed.18
The predominance of the territorial criterion in determining the fate
of individuals remained even after the era of bourgeois revolution.
With the development of thought stressing the free and autonomous
character of individuals, however, the appurtenance theory began to be
replaced by the doctrines of "plebiscite" and "option of nationality."' 9
An option clause was adopted in most treaties of cession and annexa-
tion both in times of peace and as peace settlements.20
The prevalence of option clauses in the treaties did not affect the
principle of automatic change, but rather confirmed it. Because auto-
matic change was deemed axiomatic, it was not necessary to stipulate
as such in the treaties of cession. Only when it was necessary to avoid
its application did treaties explicitly provide otherwise.
The axiomatic nature of the principle of automatic change can easily
be demonstrated. First, most treaties adopted the domicile principle in
determining who would be eligible for the option. They generally
granted the right to retain or to recover the nationality of the ceding
state to the nationals of the ceding state residing in the ceded territory,
Henry IV that "Paris vaut bien une messe," supported by the realistic demands of the grow-
ing bourgeoisie, finally transcended the prevailing religious heterogeneity. Deutsch empha-
sizes the unique character of the homogeneity of Western European nations as "the
patchwork world of national assimilation." K. DEtTSCH, NATIONALISM AND ITS ALTERNA-
TIVES 38 (1969). On the other hand, this homogeneity should not be overemphasized: the
contemporary emergence of separatist movements and active claims of rights of minorities
reveal the mythical character of homogeneity in many Western European nations. How-
ever, it cannot be denied that they have had a relatively high degree of homogeneity com-
pared with other areas such as Eastern Europe or Africa. In addition, the existence of a
general belie/ in homogeneity made possible, to a certain degree, settlement based on territo-
riality. See Onuma, supra note 16, at 543.
18. With the establishment of the principle of automatic change of subjecthood pursuant
to territorial change, the predecessor of the "option of nationality" appeared in the form of a
provision which allowed the inhabitants to emigrate. This benefcium emigrandi clause first
appeared in the Capitulation Treaty of the City of Arras of 1640 and was followed by many
treaties of peace, cession, and annexation through the early nineteenth century. See 1 J.
KuNz, supra note 5, at 30-47' E. SZLECHTER, supra note 16, at 87-101; H. JELLINEK, supra
note 5, at 11-25.
19. After a series of bourgeois revolutions from the eighteenth to nineteenth century,
nation states founded their legitimacy on the will of the people within the territorial unit.
Under the influence of the social contract theory, individuals were deemed to have inherent
freedom and equality and to acquire the status of voluntary and autonomous members of a
nation state. In the nineteenth century, the concept of citizen, which implied participation in
the political process of a nation state, gradually became widespread. Onuma, supra note 16,
at 533, 547. See also A.N. MAKAROV, ALLGEMEINE LEHREN DES STAATS-
AI4GEH6RIGKErsRECHTS, at 8-9 (1962).
20. See note 18 supra.
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without stipulating the effect of the cession of territory on their nation-
ality.21 In addition, of the few treaties which provided the right to opt
for the new nationality, most of them granted the right only to those
who had been born in the territory but no longer resided there. This
was intended to provide an opportunity to acquire the nationality of
the successor state to those who, although non-resident, had a certain
link with the territory. Furthermore, the exceptional treaties which
granted the right to opt for the new nationality to the inhabitants of the
ceded territory explicitly provided that they would retain the former
nationality if they did not exercise the right.22
These features apparently presupposed the principle of automatic
change of nationality of the nationals of the ceding state residing in the
ceded territory. The predominance of this principle was supported not
only by the interpretation of the treaties of cession, but also by the
proclamations and declarations of states, writings of authors, decisions
of arbitral tribunals, and judgments of domestic courts in the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.23
This principle was also valid in cases involving territorial change
other than those of "cession of territory." It was taken for granted that
cases of complete annexation were settled in accordance with this prin-
ciple. Attainment of independence by European nations in this era had
little impact on the traditional framework.24 When Western Hemi-
spheric nations achieved independence in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, their nationals were also determined by the criterion
of residence.25
In this era, the essential meaning of independence, i e., the self-deter-
21. "The one who opts does not choose between two nationalities, but only has the right
to retain one's old nationality." I J. KuNz, supra note 5, at 83.
22. Logically, it is possible to interpret the rare provisions providing for the retention of
the former nationality when the inhabitants do not exercise the right of option as being
declaratory of the general principle. Upon taking all considerations into account, however,
this interpretation cannot prevail.
23. See, e.g., E. SZLECHTER, supra note 16, at 88-89 n.83; id at 97 n.102; id at 136 n.43
&passim; H. JELLINEK, supra note 5, at 50-59; J.M. JONES, BRITISH NATIONALITY LAW AND
PRACTICE 39-56 (1947).
24. See, eg., arguments cited in H. JELLINEK, supra note 5, at 9-25.
25. When the United States gained independence from Great Britain, judgments of both
states unanimously regarded residence in the United States as the requirement for the acqui-
sition of U.S. nationality, although they differed in reasoning and in determining the critical
date for the change of nationality. Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246-47 (1830);
Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892); Doe v. Acklam, 2 B. & C. 779, 792-93 (1824).
Latin American countries also determined who were to be their nationals on the basis of
territoriality. See I E.S. ZEBALLOS, NATIONALITA AU POINT DE VUE DE LA LEGISLATION
COMPAR E ET DU DROIT PRivA HUmAiN 630-88 (1914); 2 id 85-156 (1919); J. DE BURLET,
supra note 8, at 139-75.
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ruination of a people, was not fully appreciated when the relationship
between nationality and territorial change was considered. It was the
change of nationality as a consequence of cession (or annexation) of
territory that was deemed the typical form of this relationship. Accord-
ing to the logic of this idea, territorial change was deemed to take pre-
cedence; pursuant to this the change of nationality of those who had a
certain link with the territory (usually residence) was recognized. The
aforementioned appurtenance theory, although rejected as an explicit
doctrine, still survived as an implicit frame of reference as expressed in
such terms as "change of nationality pursuant to territorial change" or
"effect of territorial change on the nationality."26 Thus, between the
era of absolutism and World War I, nationality problems accompany-
ing territorial change were settled by means of treaties which presup-
posed the principle of automatic change.
B. Gradual Change of the Status of the Domicile Principle
The stable international practice described above changed considera-
bly after World War I. It is true that the Peace Treaties and Minority
Treaties explicitly provided that inhabitants of the newly independent
states as well as those in territories transferred from one state to an-
other would ipsofacto obtain the new nationality and lose their former
nationality.27 In this respect the principle of automatic change remains
basic. The meaning of the principle, however, changed considerably.
First, the validity of the traditional principle was restricted in that a
certain category of nationals residing in the territory could not acquire
the new nationality.2 For example, the inhabitants of territories trans-
ferred from Germany to Poland who had not resided there long enough
could not acquire the new nationality but retained their former nation-
ality. This was to prevent those inhabitants which composed the van-
26. However, the framework of nationality change as a consequence of territorial change
cannot be explained by merely a feudalistic concept of appurtenance. As later discussed,
territorial residence is importint, even within the contemporary framework, in presuming*
the will of individuals to participate in the body politic of the territory.
27. Treaty of Versailles, art. 84, 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-
1967 at 1325 (F. Israel ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as PEACE TREATIES]; id art. 91, 2 PEACE
TREATIEs, supra, at 1332; id art. 105, 2 PEACE TREATIES, supra, at 1341. Treaty of St.
Germain, art. 70, 3 PEACE TREATIES, supra, at 1562-63; Treaty of Trianon, art. 61, id at
1888; Treaty of Neuilly, art. 39, id at 1739. The Treaties of St. Germain and Trianon,
however, adopted ' vertinenza" (indignat), which did not necessarily coincide with territo-
rial residence, as a criterion for determining nationality.
28. Treaty of Versailles, art. 91, 2 PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 1332; Treaty of St.
Germain, art. 76, 3 PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 1564; Treaty of Trianon, art. 62, id at
1888; Treaty of Neuilly, art. 39, id at 1739.
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guard of the settlement policy of the Central Powers from acquiring the
nationality of the newly independent states.
Second, not only resident but non-resident individuals involved in
the independence or transfer of territory #?sofacto acquired a new na-
tionality, or were given the right to opt for it. This group of non-resi-
dents was not limited to those who were born in the territory
concerned,29 but included those who belonged to the same nation in the
ethnic sense, or the same racial or linguistic population. 30
Third, plebiscites were held in certain districts. Those in Schleswig
and Klagenfurt were decisive in the disposition of the territory itself,
while others were consultative.31
Fourth, the nationality settlement as respects inhabitants of Alsace-
Lorraine was based not on change of nationality corresponding to terri-
torial change, but on independent criteria. The restoration of Alsace-
Lorraine to France as of November 11, 1918 did not have an immedi-
ate effect on the nationality of the inhabitants. The inhabitants were
divided according to each individual's relationship to the German
domination over Alsace-Lorraine that lasted from 1871 to 1918. For
example, while persons who became German nationals by the applica-
tion of the Frankfurt Treaty of 1871 were "iso facto reinstated in
French nationality," German residents who migrated to Alsace-Lor-
raine during the period of German domination could not acquire
French nationality. 32 This settlement was based on a negative assess-
ment of the German rule of Alsace-Lorraine, which had been "sepa-
29. Treaty Regarding the Independence of Poland and the Protection of Minorities,
June 28, 1919, art. 4, 13 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d ser.) 505; Treaty Regarding the Inde-
pendence of Czechoslovakia and the Protection of Minorities, Sept. 10, 1919, art. 4, id at
515; Treaty to Settle Certain Questions Raised by the Formation of the Kingdom of Serbi-
ans, Croatians, and Slovaks, Sept. 10, 1919, art. 4, id at 524; Peace Treaty, July 12, 1920,
U.S.S.R.-Lithuania, art. 6, 11 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d ser.) 881-82; Peace Treaty,
Aug. 11, 1920, Russia-Lettonia, art. 8, id at 893-94.
30. Treaty of Versailles, art. 85, 2 PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 1325; id, art. 91, 2
PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 1332; Treaty of Neuilly, art. 40, 3 PEACE TREATIES, supra
note 27, at 1740; Treaty of St. Germain, art. 80, id at 1565; Treaty of Trianon, art. 64, id at
1889; Treaty of Lausanne, art. 32,4 PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 2315. Language was
adopted as a criterion in granting new nationality or the right of option not only in the treaty
provisions; but also as a means of designating the members of a state in domestic laws. For
example, Czechoslovakia and Italy adopted their respective languages as the criterion in
determining whether one belonged to their nation. E. SZLECHTER, supra note 12, at 290-92.
31. Treaty of Versailles, art. 109, 2 PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 1342-44; Treaty of
St. Germain, art. 50, 3 PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 1555-57; Treaty of Versailles, art.
34, pt. 3, § 8, Annex 5, 6, 2 PEACE TREATIES, supra note 27, at 1293-94; Id art. 95, 2 PEACETREATIES, supra note 27, at 1330-31; id art. 97, 2 PEACE TR ATIES, supra note 27, at 1334-
37.




rated. . . in spite of the solemn protest" from France by "the wrong
done by Germany in 187 1.33 Thus, the legality of the forty-seven year
German domination was totally denied, and the status quo ante was
restored.
Finally, there was no place for "cession of territory" in the Peace
Treaties. Terms such as "ckder," "ttat ckdant" or "b~at cessionaire,"
often used in the nineteenth century, were seldom used, but terms "re-
noncer," "tran,&/rer," "attribuer a" or "tat exerqant la sourverainetM
sur ledit territoire" were adopted.34
The adoption of these various criteria in determining who were sub-
ject to nationality change reflected the fact that members of ethnic
populations, which may be said to constitute "ethnic nations," were
more geographically dispersed in Eastern Europe than in Western Eu-
rope. in addition, the principle of national self-determination was
claimed much more strongly than before. Consequently, the frame-
work subordinating the fate of individuals to territory could hardly be
maintained. Cession of territory, which implies disposability of both
territory and people as property, was no longer invoked. Furthermore,
the nineteenth century doctrine of international law, which regarded
war as a meta-legal phenomenon, began to be replaced by the concept
of the illegality of war. Thus, the negative legal assesment of the wars
Germany waged in 1870 and 1914 had an impact on the nationality
settlement of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine and other areas settled
by nationals of the Central Powers. Finally, since the abolition of auto-
cratic rule was proclaimed as one of the war aims of the Allied Powers,
the peace settlement was expected to respect the rights and freedom of
individuals as much as possible. Even if ethnic nations were geograph-
ically dispersed, the forceful exchange of inhabitants was out of the
question. Rights of minorities, including the right to the nationality of
the states to which they ethnically belonged, were to be respected.
These factors affected the principle of automatic change. Although
the Peace Treaties still adopted this principle as basic, it now became
necessary to explicitly stipulate it. Without such explicit provisions,
there would have been confusion as to what the basic principle was,
because the Treaties adopted various criteria other than residence. Be-
cause previously this principle was taken for granted and did not need
to be explicitly articulated, this fact indicates the relative decline of the
33. Treaty of Versailles, pt. 3, § 5, Preamble, id at 1311.
34. But see the case of Alsace-Lorraine, where the Treaty provided for "the territories
which were ceded to Germany .. " Treaty of Versailles, art. 51, id This provision, how-
ever, referred to a past event, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
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traditional framework.35 On the other hand, the domicile principle was
utilized as a supplementary rule to avoid statelessness, and every effort
was made to provide the right of option for those who were subject to
nationality change. Thus, ideas of national self-determination and
human rights played a significant role in framing the nationality
problems related to territorial change in the peace settlements follow-
ing World War I.
This tendency was confirmed by judgments of courts during the in-
ter-war period. During this period, cases concerning changes of nation-
ality accompanying territorial change were not settled uniformly by the
principle of automatic change. Many judgments did not invoke this
principle. In addition, because the treaties and domestic legal systems
adopted the various criteria described above, court decisions naturally
invoked them. In many cases, the courts affirmed the change of nation-
ality of non-residents of the territories concerned. Furthermore, even
when the courts adopted the domicile principle, they did not rely on the
simple fact of residence, but rather tried to base it on the free will of the
individuals and the territorial effect of the domestic law. Thus the un-
derlying rationale of the domicile principle came to differ from the
traditional one.
In Schwarzkopf v. Uhl,36 where the nationality of Austrians residing
in the United States was in question, a U.S. circuit court of appeals
denied the effect of the imposition of German nationality on non-resi-
dent Austrian nationals on the grounds that: (1) under international
law, an invader cannot impose its nationality upon non-residents of the
subjugated country without their consent; (2) the word 'citizen' as used
in the statute concerned must be construed in the light of the accepted
right of election. 37 On the other hand, in many cases, such as Wilder-
mann v. Stinnes,38 Romano v. Comma,39 and Pini v. Pini40 courts simply
rejected the domicile principle.
The principle of automatic change as a principle of international law
35. Engestrbm claimed as early as the beginning of the 1920's that "fL]a dknationallsa-
tion nlestplus une suite de la cession. La cession est au contraire la consxquence de la national-
itk." E. ENGESTRrM, LEs CHANGEMENTS DE NATIONALITA D'APRPS LES TRAITLS DE PAIX
DE 1919-1920, at 19 (1923). Szlechter, having done an elaborate study on treaties from the
eighteenth century to after World War I, also asserted that "[/ous les habitants domicilliks sur
le territoire ctd ne sauraientpas changer de nationalitb en vertu d'unprincpe de droit interna-
tional; changent seulement de nationalitb ceux qui sont explicitement viss par les traims." E.
SZLECHTER, supra note 6, at 102.
36. [1943-1945] Ann. Dig. 188, 137 F.2d 898 (2d Cir. 1943).
37. Id. at 194, 137 F.2d at 903.
38. [1923-1924] Ann. Dig. 224.
39. [1925-1926] Ann. Dig. 265.
40. Id. at 266.
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in that period can be seen in Peinitsch v. Germany,41 one of the most
famous cases in this area. In the judgment, the Germano-Yugoslav
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal said "'It is a rule of international law that
when a territory [in question] passes to a new sovereign, it must, in case
of doubt, be assumed that those inhabitants of the territory in question
who are not domiciled (domicillis) there do not acquire the new na-
tionality.' "42 Here, the principle of automatic change was referred to
only in a restrained and indirect manner. It was still considered basic,
to be utilized when no concrete provisions were controlling, but was
not taken for granted.
In place of the traditional domicile principle, the free and voluntary
will of individuals came to be a major criterion in determining nation-
ality accompanying territorial change. Although the voluntary charac-
ter of nationality had always been deemed important in nationality, it
had not been considered in determining nationality itself, except in the
form of option clauses. In contrast, it was considered in the judgments
of this era to be one of the most important factors in determining na-
tionality, even in the absence of the option clause. This trend would
become even more clear after World War II, when African and Asian
nations achieved independence at an explosive rate.
II. Nationality Settlement Related to Territorial Change in the
Contemporary World
A. Nationality Settlements As a Consequence of Decolonization
Most of the nationality settlements relating to territorial change after
World War II occurred either as a consequence of decolonization or as
a peace settlement pertaining directly to the war.43 Among the former
cases, those involving the United Kingdom and France are the over-
whelming majority. To grasp the general features of nationality settle-
ment as a consequence of decolonization, it is important to examine
how nationality problems were settled when colonies became in-
dependent from those two countries.
41. [1923-1924] Ann. Dig. 227.
42. Id. at 228, citing WEiss, MANUEL DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIPv 162 (6th ed.
1909).
43. For a more extensive survey, see J. DE BURLET, supra note 8; G. BRnuNio, supra
note 2; R. DECOTTIONIES & M. DE BIEVILLE, supra note 8; Onuma, supra note 16, at 529-96,
911-80.
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1. Nationality Settlements Accompanying Independence From the
United Kingdom
World War II marked a turning point in the nationality status of the
former British subjects.44 Immediately after the war, the Dominion
states led by Canada and the newly independent states of India, Paki-
stan and Ceylon sought to define their own nationality. Nationality
problems between these countries and the United Kingdom were not
settled by international agreements, but rather by a combination of the
domestic laws of the United Kingdom and of each newly independent
state.
From 1946 to 1955, each Commonwealth country enacted its nation-
ality law and determined its nationals according to its own conception
of its nation. For example, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
adopted a qualified form ofjus soli as the basic principle governing the
acquisition of nationality, usingjus sanguinis as a, supplementary rule.
India and Pakistan, which had serious disputes regarding the allocation
of territory and people, enacted complex nationality laws combining
the principles of domicile and birth with other supplementary provi-
sions. To determine who would be their original nationals, some coun-
tries provided transitional provisions, such as the domicile principle or
the birth principle, whereas others simply applied permanent provi-
sions regarding the acquisition of nationality by birth, such asjus soli
andjus sanguinis.45
When the United Kingdom enacted the Nationality Act of 1948,46
Canada had already enacted its Citizenship Act. Others were either in
the process of enacting their own acts or were expected to do so. It was
not expected that these states would adopt a uniform criterion, e.g., the
domicile principle, to determine their nationals.47 Had the United
Kingdom adopted some positive requirement, e.g., residence in the
United Kingdom, some of the former British subjects could have had
neither the nationality of a newly independent state nor that of the
United Kingdom. The 1948 Act prevented such a result. Although it
44. See C. PARRY, NATIONALITY AND CITIZENSHIP LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND
OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (1957); J.M. JONES, supra note 23, at 27-73; Clute, Nationality
and Citizenship, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW STANDARD AND COMMONWEALTH DEVELOP-
MENTS 100-36 (R. Wilson ed. 1966).
45. Logically speaking, it is necessary for all countries to enact transitional provisions for
determining who are their nationals at the moment of the country's creation. Permanent
provisions, which should be applied only to the children of those who acquired nationality
under transitional provisions were, however, applied by some countries to determine who
would be their original nationals.
46. British Nationality Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 56.
47. As to the variety of the principles actually adopted by each country, see C. PARRY,
supra note 44, at 467-68, 475-78, 582-87, 640-44, 698-704, 791-97, 798-802, 848-50, 858-60,
887, 890-93; J. DE BURLET, supra note 8, at 146-60.
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recognized British nationality based on certain prerequisites, such as
birth in the United Kingdom and its colonies, it also recognized as Brit-
ish subjects those who neither satisfied such prerequisites nor were ac-
tual or potential citizens of any of the Commonwealth countries or
Eire.4 8 In this way, the United Kingdom, assuming that the determina-
tion of the nationals of the Commonwealth countries would be primar-
ily left to those countries, recognized as British subjects those who
would otherwise have been stateless.
Because all the Commonwealth countries, to a greater or lesser de-
gree, recognized non-residents who had a certain link with them as
their nationals, a considerable number of those residing abroad (in-
cluding in the United Kingdom) acquired the nationality of those con-
tries. They were given the status of "citizens of the Commonwealth"
by virtue of being citizens of a Commonwealth country,49 and enjoyed
certain privileges, such as rights to enter and reside in the United King-
dom, although they were not British nationals. While these privileges
have been gradually restricted by recent British immigration legisla-
tion, Commonwealth citizens still enjoy certain privileges, especially if
settled in the United Kingdom. 50 This indicates, though to a limited
degree, the concern for the protection of the lives of individuals af-
fected by the attainment of independence.
It was when Ghana gained independence that a new formulation of
nationality settlements became necessary. The Ghana Independence
Act did not include general provisions on nationality settlement.
Ghana enacted its own nationality law upon independence and deter-
mined its nationals primarily by the criterion of birth.5' On the other
hand, the United Kingdom regarded the Ghanian people as having
both Ghanian and British nationality.52 In order to settle their "dual"
status, the United Kingdom enacted the Nationality Act of 1958, which
contained the following features: (1) Any person who was a British
subject would cease to be so if. (a) he was then a citizen of Ghana; and,
(b) he, his father or his father's father was born in Ghana. (2) A person
would not cease to be a British subject, however, if he, his father or his
father's father satisfied certain requirements such as birth or naturaliza-
tion in the United Kingdom. (3) A wife of a British subject would not
lose British nationality unless her husband did so.53
48. British Nationality Act, 1948, § 12(1)-(4), 1 HALSBURY'S STAT. OF ENGLAND 871-72
(3d ed. 1968).
49. Id. § 1, at 862-63.
50. See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
51. Nationality and Citizenship Act (Ghana), 1957, § 4-6, U.N. LEG. S. SUPPLEMENT TO
THE LAWS CONCERNING NATIONALITY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/9, at 127 (1959).
52. 581 H.C. DEB. 283 (5th ser. 1958).
53. British Nationality Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 10, § 2, 1 HALSBURY'S STAT. 895-96.
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These features were incorporated thereafter in each Independence
Act beginning with the independence of Nigeria (1960)54 through that
of Uganda (1962). 55 Furthermore, basically the same provisions have
been incorporated in each subsequent Independence Act, beginning
with the independence of Kenya (1963).56 Thus, the above provisions
have been the typical clauses in nationality settlements accompanying
independence since 1958.57
Nationality settlements under the 1948 Act, the 1958 Act and the
subsequent Independence Acts have certain common characteristics.
First, nationality problems were not settled by treaties, but by the do-
mestic laws of both states concerned. In determining who should ac-
quire the nationality of the newly independent states and who should
retain the former nationality, priority was given to the domestic laws of
the newly independent state. Although in many cases these new do-
mestic laws were not in existence at the time British domestic legisla-
tion was enacted, the British laws presupposed this determination by
the newly independent states, and only assumed the secondary and
supplementary role of guaranteeing British nationality to certain for-
mer British subjects.
Second, wide variety exists in the nationality legislation of the newly
independent states, especially in the criteria for determining who would
be their nationals. Because they did not have a high degree of homoge-
neity within their territories, they had to adopt a variety of criteria.
Third, concern for human rights of those affected by independence
prevails. Most apparent is the keen and continuous concern for avoid-
ing statelessness: the United Kingdom feared that some former British
subjects could not become nationals of the newly independent states,
even if they resided there.58 The United Kingdom also wanted a cer-
tain category of British subjects to retain British nationality irrespective
of their acquisition of the new nationality. Furthermore, the United
Kingdom guaranteed certain privileges which were not given to ordi-
nary aliens to those who were no longer British nationals as a result of
their new nationality.
Finally, a basic change can be seen in the status and meaning of the
principle of automatic change. Neither the United Kingdom nor the
54. Nigeria Independence Act, 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, ch. 55, § 2, 4 HALSBURY'S STATUTES
401-02.
55. Uganda Independence Act, 1962, 10 & 11 Eliz. 2, ch. 57, § 2. Id. at 441.
56. Kenya Independence Act, 1963, ch. 54, § 2. Id. at 339.
57. As to the provisions of the subsequent Independence Acts, see 4 HALSBURY'S STAT.
and THE PUBLIC GENERAL AcTs of the years following 1968.
58. See the parliamentary debates, supra note 52, at 279-312. See also Clute, supra note
44, at 118-19; Plender, The Exodus ofAsiansfrom East and CentralAfrica: Some Compara-
tive and International LawAsfpects, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 287, 293-94 (1971).
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newly independent states presumed that the inhabitants of the latter
would i0sofacto lose British nationality and acquire the nationality of
the new states.59 The newly independent states determined who would
be their nationals utilizing a variety of criteria, as an essential process
of self-determination. The United Kingdom presumed this unilateral
determination, and tried to avoid undesirable results arising therefrom
by enacting its own domestic law.
2. Nationality Settlements Accompanying Independence from France
The overwhelming majority of nationality problems accompanying
independence from France were settled according to the Law of July
28, 1960,60 and the provisions thereof incorporated in the radically
amended Nationality Law of 1973.61 The principles for these settle-
ments were originally adopted when twelve nations gained indepen-
dence in 1960. Article 13 of the French Nationality Law of 1945, which
would otherwise have applied, provided that if a treaty of cession did
not contain provisions concerning nationality, "the persons having
domicile in the ceded territories shall lose the French nationality."62
"Had this provision been applied in these cases, those who continued
residing in the newly independent states would have lost French na-
tionality, whatever link they might have had with France. Such a re-
sult would have been against the wishes of those who wanted to retain
French nationality, and against the intention of the French govern-
ment, which sought to retain many such people as French nationals. 63
On the other hand, the newly independent states did not want to
solve problems raised by independence within the traditional frame-
work of state succession.64 They emphasized the essential character of
national self-determination and tried to solve the problems within their
domestic jurisdictions. Thus, they rejected settling nationality
problems by means of treaties and determined who were to be their
nationals according to their concepts of nationhood and their histories.
Although some countries adopted the criterion of residence, most coun-
59. When Ghana became independent, the United Kingdom regarded the Ghanian peo-
ple as having both Ghanian and British nationality, unless settled by the 1958 Act. Had the
United Kingdom adhered to the principle of automatic change, such an argument would
have been impossible. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
60. Law No. 60-752, 1960 Dalloz Bulletin L~gislatif [D. Bull Leg.] 566.
61. J. Off. (Fr.), Jan. 10, 1973.
62. J. Off. (Fr.), Oct. 20, 1945, at 6702.
63. See J. FOYER, TRAVAUX DU COMITA FRANqAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIV.,
144-45 (1962), cited in Lagarde, De que/ques consnquences de la dkolonisalion sur le drolt
franfais de nationalitM, MELANGES OFFERTS k RENE SAVATIER 509, 513-14 (1965).
64. See R. DECOTrIGNIES & M. DE BIEVILLE, supra note 8, at 44; R. BILBAO, LE DRorr
MALGACHE DE LA NATIONALITP 42-43 (1962).
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tries employed other criteria, such asjus soi jus sanguinis and race;65 in
many cases permanent provisions were applied on the acquisition of
nationality. Even countries which adopted the domicile principle did
not necessarily recognize all inhabitants as their nationals. Thus, the
combination of Article 13 of the 1945 French Nationality Law and de-
termination by the newly independent states of their nationals would
have resulted in massive statelessness.
In order to avoid such a result, France enacted the Law of July 28,
1960, which contained the following features: (1) "originaires,
coujoints, veufs ou veuves d'originaires" of France, as well as "leurs de-
scendants" would retain French nationality even if they resided in
newly independent states; (2) those who were not included in (1), but
did not acquire another nationality by a general provision would also
retain French nationality; and (3) those upon whom another national-
ity was conferred by a general provision '"peuvent sefaire reconnaltre"
French nationals by following certain procedures. 66
This formulation was incorporated in the totally revised Nationality
Law of 1973. It contains in Chapter VII clauses essentially the same as
those in the 1960 Law to determine "the effects on the French national-
ity of the attainment of independence of former overseas departments
or territories of the French Republic." 67 The above characteristics
show the general features of French laws which have purported to set-
tle the nationality problems raised by the independence of former
colonies.
The nationality settlement upon the independence of Algeria fol-
lowed basically the same pattern. The Evian Agreements of 1962,
which recognized the independence of Algeria, had no general provi-
sions on nationality settlement, but assumed that the determination of
Algerian nationality was to be left to Algerian domestic law.68 Thus,
this problem was also settled by a combination of domestic laws.
France enacted the Order of July 21, 1962, that basically followed the
scheme of the 1960 Law except for the criterion for dividing those af-
fected by the independence. While the 1960 Law adopted the criterion
of "origin," it adopted the "status," which had been utilized in Algeria
for distinguishing the Islamic population and other minority popula-
tions. Thus, so far as French law was concerned, former French na-
tionals having the "statut civil de droit commun" retained French
65. On the variety of criteria, see R. DECOTTIGNIES & M. DE BIEVILLE, supra note 8; G.
BREUNIO, supra note 2, at 134-205; J. DE BURLET, supra note 8, at 144-80.
66. Law No. 60-752, 1960 D. Bull. Leg. 566.
67. Law No. 73-42 of Jan., 1973, Arts. 13, 20, J. Off. (Fr.), Jan. 10, 1973, at 467, 472.
68. Declarations Adopted on 19 March 1962 at the Close of the Evian Talks, 507
U.N.T.S. 29, 43-44 (1964).
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nationality. French nationals of Algerian origin having the "statut civil
de droit local" were entitled "se faire reconnatre" French nationals.
They retained French nationality if they were not accorded another
nationality.69 On the other hand, Algeria enacted its Nationality Law
in 1963 and determined who were to be its nationals based on the com-
bination of religion, jus sanguinis and qualifiedjus soli.70 Thus, so far
as Algerian law was concerned, Algerians defined in these terms ac-
quired Algerian nationality irrespective of their residence.
The following features in the 1960 Law, shared by the 1962 Order,
and incorporated as permanent provisions into the 1973 Law, charac-
terize the nationality settlements accompanying the independence of
France's former colonies. First, nationality problems were not settled
by treaties, but rather by the domestic laws of both states.71 Second,
nationality legislation, especially as respects the criteria employed in
determining nationals, varied widely among the newly independent
states. Third, France showed a deep concern for having people with
certain ties to France, such as birth, residence or unity of family, retain
French nationality. Newly independent states also manifested concern
in this area by granting a right of option to those who did not psofacto
acquire their nationality, and in particular, to the spouses of their na-
tionals.72 Finally, the traditional principle of automatic change was not
sustained by either France or the newly independent states. When the
nationality problems raised by the independence of former colonies
were discussed, France did not believe that this principle would govern
the relationship between France and the newly independent states.
During the discussion of the 1960 Law in the National Assembly it was
proposed that Article 13 of the 1945 Law be suspended, because it
would take too long to pass the 1960 Law. The French government,
however, strongly opposed the proposal, insisting that such a solution
would produce dual nationality in every newly independent state.73
69. Ordonnance No. 62-825, July 21, 1962, Arts. 1, 2, 1962 D. Bull. Leg. 465.
70. Law No. 63-96 of Mar. 27, 1963, Arts. 2, 5, 34, 43, J. Off. (Algeria), Apr. 2, 1963, at
306 and errata, Apr. 12, 1963.
71. There are a few cases in which the nationality problems were allegedly settled by
treaties. In the case of Tunisia, however, Tunisian nationality had already existed before the
treaty was concluded. The treaty did not allocate the nationality of people between France
and Tunisia, but merely contained clarifying provisions. General Treaty, June 3, 1955,
France-Tunisia, 1955 D. Bull. Leg. 909. The treaty between France and South Vietnam (J.
Off. (Fr.), May 3, 1959, at 4767) did have general provisions on nationality, but it was not a
definitive settlement, for it became null and void when Vietnam was unified. J. Off. (Fr.),
Aug. 19, 1976, at 4987.
72. See, e.g., Ordonnance of Mar. 1, 1960 (Code de la Nationalt Guinenne) art. 141, R.
DECOTrIGNIES & M. DE BIEViLLE, supra note 8, at 173-74; Law of June 12, 1961 (Code de la
Nationalit& Mauritanienne) art. 71, id at 267; Law of Dec. 1, 1961 (Code de la Nationalitt
VoltaYque) art. 122, id at 380. See also id at 30-34; J. DE BuRLTr, supra note 8, at 172-73.
73. J. Off. Deb. Parl., Sen. (Fr.), July 20, 1960, session, at 1024.
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Had the French government adhered to the principle of automatic
change, Article 13 would have been of a merely declaratory character,
and the inhabitants of newly independent states would ipsofacto have
lost French nationality and would have acquired the new nationality.
The "dual" nationality issue would never have arisen. The above argu-
ment demonstrates that France was not prepared to follow this
principle.
The newly independent states likewise did not adhere to this princi-
ple. Most of them rejected dealing with problems raised by indepen-
dence within the framework of state succession, and emphasized the
sovereign and constitutive character of their own determination of na-
tionality. In addition, because they did not have a high degree of ho-
mogeneity within their territories, they had to rely on a variety of
criteria other than residence in determining who were to be their na-
tionals. Thus, the traditional principle of automatic change was re-
jected by newly independent states on both ideological and substantive
grounds.
B. Nationality Settlements in the Peace Settlement Following World
War I
World War II ended with the defeat of the Axis Powers. Both the
war they waged and their rule over foreign peoples were judged illegal.
Thus, the Axis Powers' defeat meant the liberation of subjugated peo-
ples. The self-determination of these people was to be the guiding
principle for settling nationality and territorial problems.
1. Independence and Transfer of Territory from Germany
In the case of the independence of Austria, Austria enacted the Na-
tionality Transfer Law of July 10, 1945, after the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. It provided that those who had Austrian nationality on
March 13, 1938, and those who would have acquired Austrian nation-
ality if the Federal Law of July 30, 1925 on the Acquisition and Loss of
Austrian Nationality had been valid, were Austrian nationals as of
April 27, 1945, the date of the restoration of independence. 74 Thus,
Austria determined who would be its nationals irrespective of the resi-
dence of the people concerned.
This Austrian settlement basically has been recognized by both
Germanys. East Germany has regarded those who recovered Austrian
nationality as having lost German nationality even if they were resid-
74. [1945] Staatsgesetzblatt (Aus.) item 59, § 1, at 81.
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ing in East Germany.75 In West Germany, there has been a change in
court judgments concerning the nationality of Austrians residing there.
Earlier judgments tended to regard Austrians in West Germany as re-
taining German nationality.76 However, in the judgment of November
9, 1955, the Federal Constitutional Court held that all Austrians in-
cluding those residing in Germany lost their German nationality on the
day Austria was re-established.77
The Second Law on Questions of Nationality of May 17, 1956,
finally settled this problem. It provided that German nationality ac-
cording to the Orders of July 3, 1938, and of June 30, 1939, was extin-
guished as of April 26, 1945 (Article 1). However, those who lost
German nationality were entitled to reacquire it if they had been con-
tinuously resident in Germany since April 26, 1945 (Article 3(1)). The
right to reacquire German nationality was also granted to their wives
and children (Article 3(2)).78
This settlement was based on the view that the attainment of the
independence of Austria entailed the restoration of the status quo ante
before the illegal Anschluss and that West Germany should respect the
unity of the Austrian nation. 79 On the other hand, the Law sought to
respect the free and voluntary will of the Austrians in Germany, based
on their residence and membership in German communities. Respect
for this free will was not limited to Austrians in the ethnic sense, but
also to those standing in a family relationship to them. Thus, the right
of option was granted to this broader circle of people. In this way,
West Germany settled nationality problems vis-4z-vis Austria by refer-
ence to respect for national self-determination of Austria and for the
will and life of individuals directly or indirectly affected.80
75. This is evidenced by a combination of several facts: (1) East Germany has regarded
the Anschluss as null and void under international law; (2) when East Germany was estab-
lished in 1949, Germans, in the meaning of the German Nationality Law of 1913, who were
residing in East Germany were deemed nationals of East Germany while Austrians, in prin-
ciple, did not become East German nationals; (3) the East German Nationality Law of Feb.
20, 1967, reaffirmed point (2) above, [1967] Gesetzblatt der DDR [GB1.DDR], pt. 1 § 1, at 3;
and (4) the Consular Treaty of 1957 between East Germany and Austria, which was in-
tended to settle problems concerning nationality, was based on the assumption that Austri-
ans residing in East Germany had, in principle, only Austrian nationality, [1975]
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] (Aus.) 2190.
76. E.g., the decision of Oct. 30, 1954 of the Federal Administrative Court. [1955] Juris-
tenzeitung 80.
77. [1956] Juristenzeitung 117, 118.
78. [1956] Bundesgesetzblatt (W. Ger.) 431.
79. In order to express the automatic result of the restoration of the status quo ante, the
Law deliberately employed the terminology Staatsangeharigkeit hst "erloschen" rather than
"verloren," which was employed in the Article 116 Basic Law of West Germany. In addi-
tion, it adopted April 26, 1945 as its critical date, in accordance with the critical date in the
Austrian Law of July 10, 1945.
80. Prior to its resolution of the case of Austria, West Germany enacted the First Law on
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There are also many cases in which both East and West Germany
settled nationality problems accompanying the transfer of territory by
treaties with the states which acquired or recovered these territories.
These cases exhibit basically the same features as those described
above. For example, according to the treaties of West Germany with
Belgium and the Netherlands respectively, the former German nation-
als residing in the territories transferred to Belgium or the Netherlands
retained German nationality. In spite of their retention of German na-
tionality, they were guaranteed residence in the territories. They were
also entitled to opt for Belgian or Netherlands nationality. 81 East Ger-
many also viewed Germans as retaining German nationality even if
they resided in the territories transferred from Germany. This corre-
sponded to the attitude of the states which acquired (or recovered)
these territories. For example, while East Germany recognized the in-
corporation of Eastern Prussia into Poland by the Treaty of June 7,
1950, both states regarded Germans residing there, in principle, as hav-
ing only German nationality.82
2. Independence and Traner of Territory from Italy
The Italian Peace Treaty of 1947 provided that Italian citizens domi-
ciled on June 10, 1940, in the territory transferred from Italy to another
state would acquire the new nationality.8 3 This provision was also ap-
plied by the Italian Supreme Court to a nationality case upon the inde-
pendence of Libya.84 Although these solutions seem to follow the
principle of automatic change, they also contain several features which
must be reconsidered from new perspectives. First, the critical date
which defined those who were subject to change was the date of decla-
ration of war by Italy. Inhabitants who were settled after Italy declared
war could not become nationals of the states acquiring those territories.
This formulation derived from the negative assessment of the war that
Italy waged. Second, the right of option was granted not to all inhabi-
tants, but only to those whose customary language was Italian (Article
19(2)). Third, in the case in which the Supreme Court applied the
Questions of Nationality, [1955] BGB1 67, according to which, Germans ("die deutschen
Volkszugehri&gen") retained German nationality even if they resided in territories trans-
ferred from Germany, unless they declined it. Here also, decisive factors were the link with
the nation in the ethnic sense and the respect for the will of individuals based on the fact of
their participation in a specific territorial community.
81. Treaty, Sept. 24, 1956, Belgium-W. Germany, art. 3(2), 314 U.N.T.S. 201; Border
Treaty, Apr. 8, 1960, Netherlands-W. Germany, art. 11 & art. 9(2), 10(2), 508 U.N.T.S. 31-
35.
82. See H. SEELER, DIE STAATSASNGEHORIGKEIT DER VOLKSDEUTSCHEN 48 (1960).
83. Art. 19(l), 4 PEACE TREATiES, supra note 27, at 2430.
84. Ministero del'interno c. Rascid Kemali, Feb. 1, 1962, 85 Foro It. 190 (1962).
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above principle to the case of independence, the major issue was
whether an Italian-Libyan in Italy was to be regarded an Italian na-
tional or a stateless person. It is not surprising from the perspective of
human rights that the Court rendered the judgment which avoided
statelessness.
Adoption of the new framework is all the more evident in the inde-
pendence of Ethiopia and Somalia. After the Italian army was ex-
pelled in 1941, Ethiopia regarded all its former nationals as Ethiopian
irrespective of their residence. When Italy formally recognized the sov-
ereignty and independence of Ethiopia, Italy regarded all former Ethi-
opian nationals as Ethiopian, even if they resided in Italy or in third
states.85 Thus, respect for the self-determination of the Ethiopians, i e.,
the restoration of the independence of Ethiopia, was the decisive factor
in settling the problem. In the case of Somalia, its nationals were deter-
minfed by Somalia's domestic law, based on the combination of jus
sanguinis and the nationality principle. Belonging to the nation in
terms of origin, language or tradition was decisive in determining who
were to be its nationals. 86 Italy, having already renounced all rights
and titles to the former territorial possessions in Africa in the Peace
Treaty, accepted the effect of the Somalian domestic law.
3. Independence of Korea from Japan
Korea regained independence under two separate governments. No
treaty was concluded between Korea and Japan to settle nationality
problems. Korean nationality was determined independently and dif-
ferently by North and South Korea, but based on a common criterion.
South Korea (R.O.K.) enacted its Nationality Act in 1948, and applied
its permanent provisions to determine who were to be its nationals.
The Korean people defined in terms of jus sanguinis were regarded
South Korean nationals.8 7 Thus, not only Koreans in South Korea, but
also in North Korea as well as those residing abroad were deemed
South Korean nationals. North Korea (D.P.R.K.) has maintained basi-
cally the same attitude. Measures concerning nationality taken by
North Korean authorities after 1945 were based on the ethnic criterion
of the nation. Those who ethnically belonged to foreign nations were
not regarded as Korean nationals even if they resided in North Korea,
whereas those outside North Korea were so regarded so long as they
85. The letter from the Foreign Ministry of Italy to Y. Onuma, Aug. 11, 1976, confirmed
this position.
86. Citizenship Law of Dec. 22, 1962, art. 2, Off. Bull. (Somalia), Suppl. No. 4 to No. 12.
87. Nationality Act of Dec. 20, 1948, art. 2, LAWS OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 18 (3d
ed. Korean Legal Center 1975).
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ethnically belonged to the Korean nation.88 The Nationality Law of
October 9, 1963 reaffirmed this position.8 9
The Japanese government has regarded all Koreans registered in the
Korean Family Registry, including those residing in Japan, as having
lost Japanese nationality.90 When Japan and South Korea concluded
the agreement on the legal status of the R.O.K. nationals in Japan in
1965, both states assumed that Koreans in Japan had only Korean na-
tionality. On this assumption, the Treaty provided for the special treat-
ment of the R.O.K. nationals, taking into consideration that the R.O.K.
nationals residing in Japan had come to have special relations with
Japanese society.91 Although some writers criticize the measures taken
by the Japanese government, they argue that the government did not
go far enough to adhere to the framework of national self-determina-
tion and human rights, rather than that the principle of automatic
change should have been applied.92
III. Nationality Settlement Within the Framework of National Self-
Determination and Human Rights
A. Nationality Settlement Within The Framework of National Self-
Determination
As discussed in Section I, the principle of automatic change was es-
tablished in Western Europe prior to World War I within the context of
cession of territory. Two basic characteristics supported this principle.
First, on the substantive level, there existed a relatively high degree of
homogeneity within territorial units. Because nations could be well de-
fined in terms of territoriality, no serious problem occurred if individu-
als followed the fate of territory. Second, on the ideological level, the
concept of individuals as an appurtenance of territory dominated the
period when this principle was prevalent. Since nationality problems
were considered and settled primarily within the context of "cession of
territory," which implied disposability of territory and inhabitants, this
88. See, e.g., Articles Concerning Divorce, Dissolution of Adoption and Restoration of
Family Registry between Koreans and Japanese of May 14, 1946, 1 HISTORICAL COLLEC-
TION OF LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF NORTH KOREA 695 (N.H. Ch'a & K.M. Chong eds.
1969).
89. CHOSEN MINSHU'SHUGI JINMIN KYOWAKOKU SHAKAISHUGI KENPO (The Socialt
Constitution of the D.P.R.I.) (M. Fukushima ed. 1974), annex 230.
90. The Japanese government has taken basically the same attitude toward the national-
ity of the Formosans, who were Japanese nationals from 1895 to 1945. Minji-ko No. 438,
Minjikyokucho Tsutatsu (Circular No. 438 of the Head of the Civil Affairs Office), Apr. 19,
1952.
91. 584 U.N.T.S. 3.
92. See Onuma, supra note 16.
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framework was not questioned. The attainment of independence by
European and Western Hemishperic nations in this era did not
threaten this framework because: (1) the essential meaning of national
self-determination was not fully recognized; and (2) Western Hemi-
spheric nations, which provided many cases of independence, were
"nations of immigrants," the fact of migrating into a territory and hav-
ing residence there was construed as participating in the establishment
of an independent nation state.
Today, one can clearly see the decline of these characteristics. On
the substantive level, territorial residence cannot always guarantee na-
tional integration, particularly in many areas of Africa and Asia where
national self-determination has been realized since World War II. In
Africa, political boundaries established by colonial powers were artifi-
cial, cutting across linguistic, ethnic, and religious lines. Colonial pow-
ers also discouraged economic development within boundaries, and
often utilized the "divide and rule" policy to maintain their domina-
tion. Therefore, the development of national consciousness within each
territory was extremely slow. Most of these "nations" became in-
dependent with a high degree of heterogeneity within their territories.93
In addition, particularly in Islamic nations, the role of religion in the
process of nation-building is much stronger than in European nations.
Since nation-building is closely connected with religion, membership in
a nation tends to be defined by reference to one's religious status rather
than to territorial residence.94 Furthermore, independence movements
seek economic as well as political independence. Newly independent
states often regard the non-indigenous population as an element of for-
eign domination, and attempt to liberate their economy from them.
Thus, residence alone does not always constitute a sufficient basis for
nationality.
On the ideological level, nationality settlements after World War II
show a primary concern for the fate of people themselves. Two major
factors require explication. First, since World War II an overwhelming
majority of nationality changes have resulted from the attainment of
independence by former colonies. According to the logic of nationality
change upon independence, nationality does not change because it fol-
lows the territorial change. It changes because a people liberates itself
from foreign rule and establishes a state composed of its own members.
93. See the words of Deutsch who said that "[i]t took centuries to make Englishmen and
Frenchmen. How are variegated tribal groups to become Tanzanians, Zambians or Malavi-
ans in one generation?" K. DEuTsCH, supra note 17, at 73.
94. See, e.g., the case of Algeria discussed supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
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Although the people who gained independence had been "nationals" of
the colonial powers in terms of international law, their nationality was
merely an empty one lacking the fundamental character of political
rights. Thus, for those people, a change of nationality upon indepen-
dence means almost the original acquisition of nationality, which has a
constitutive significance.
When European nations first became subjects of international law,
the determination of each nation's nationals was already a given, and
international law merely confirmed it. To settle nationality problems
arising from the independence of colonies by applying the principle of
automatic change, therefore, would mean the interference by interna-
tional law in a problem whose settlement was a presupposition, rather
than a consequence, of international law in the European context. It is
not surprising that newly independent nations rejected this approach.
They emphasized the sovereign and domestic character of the determi-
nation of their own nationals on the attainment of independence. 95
Former colonial powers basically recognized this approach. In most
nationality settlements accompanying independence, they did not insist
on settlement by means of treaties, but recognized that the nationals of
newly independent nations should be determined by the domestic law
of these nations. Even when a problem was settled by means of a
treaty, the unity of the newly independent nation was respected. Thus,
the criterion of the nation as a basic unit of self-determination was uti-
lized to assign nationals to each state concerned. 96
95. The emphasis upon the theory of tabula rasa by the newly independent states shows
this general attitude. See Omuma, supra note 16, at 563-64.
96. In addition to the cases cited in Section II, the independence of the Philippines from
the United States clearly shows the importance of the criterion of the nation as a basic unit
of self-determination and the decline of the domicile principle.
The Treaty between the United States and the Philippines, 61 Stat. 1174 (1946), which
recognized the latter's independence, did not include provisions to settle nationality
problems. The settlement was left to the domestic measures of both countries. The Repub-
lic of the Philippines basically succeeded the "Commonwealth" regime. The Philippines
under the Commonwealth regime enacted its own constitution and had its own citizenship,
although this did not have international meaning. The Republic of the Philippines adopted
this Commonwealth's constitution as the constitution of the Republic. Those who were citi-
zens of the Philippines during the Commonwealth period automatically became nationals of
the Republic of the Philippines irrespective of their residence. Rep. of the Phil. Const. art.
IV, V.
The position of the United States is the same. After the Philippines became independent,
U.S. court decisions unanimously treated the Filipinos residing in the United States as hav-
ing lost U.S. nationality. In Rabang v. Boyd, the Supreme Court held that "persons...
who were nationals of the United States, became aliens on July 4, 1946, regardless ofperma-
nent residence in the continental United States on that date." 353 U.S. 427, 430-31 (1957)
(emphasis added).
Thus, neither the Philippines nor the United States followed the traditional principle of
automatic change. Rather, the citizenship of the Philippines, which defined the membership
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Second, when the principle of automatic change was predominant,
war was regarded as an extra-legal phenomenon and was limited
mainly to battle of armies. Therefore, when a territory was transferred
as a result of a war, the characterization of the war had little immediate
effect on the territorial and nationality settlement. Wars in the twenti-
eth century, by contrast, came to involve every class of nation. The
notion of the illegality of war rapidly gained currency. World War II
was characterized by the United Nations as a war of aggression and
subjugation waged by the Axis Powers. The United Nations deemed
the liberation of peoples subjugated by the Axis Powers as a major war
aim. With the United Nations' victory, these people were liberated and
were to determine their political fate by themselves. With this notion
prevailing, it was inadequate to discuss nationality change as a conse-
quence of territorial change. Although the domicile principle was
adopted as one of the criteria, it was justified as a basis for the existence
of a nation and also for the actual life of individuals. This was valid
not only in cases of independence of subjugated peoples but also in
those concerning the transfer of territory.
In this way the substantive and ideological bases sustaining the prin-
ciple of automatic change in its traditional sense have been under-
mined. The majority view cannot be maintained so long as it continues
to retain the framework premised on the appurtenance theory. Interna-
tional practice shown in Section II clearly indicates that nationality
problems have been settled by reference to what kind of nationality
settlement is most suitable for the self-determination of a people. This
new framework of national self-determination can be described in the
following way.
First, the right of a newly independent nation to determine who will
be its nationals is an essential component of the right of self-determina-
tion. Because the constitutive character of determining one's original
nationals, which European nations enjoyed at their birth as nation
states, should also be recognized in the case of newly independent na-
tions, their determination of their nationals should, in principle, be rec-
ognized as having an international effect vis-,t-vis former ruling states.
Actually, as shown earlier, most former colonial powers did recognize
of the Republic of the Philippines, was adopted in assigning nationals to each state. The
United States also took certain measures to guarantee Filipinos residing in the United States
the right to be naturalized. 60 Stat. 416-17 (1946). In this way, concern for the unity of
Filipinos defined in terms of the unit for self-determination and respect for the free will of
individuals who were affected by the independence were two major factors in settling the
nationality problem.
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the primary competence of the newly independent nation in determin-
ing who were to be its nationals.
Second, this does not mean, however, that only the domestic law of
the newly independent state is decisive, as the minority view suggests.
When the domestic jurisdiction in matters of nationality is discussed, it
generally signifies that matters of nationality should be settled by the
existing domestic law of a state. The voluntary and autonomous char-
acter of nationality is generally disregarded, for the acquisition or loss
of nationality is disposed of as an application of the existing nationality
law without considering the actual will of individuals. By contrast, as
respects national self-determination, this voluntary will has a decisive
meaning. It is the commitment of individuals to a certain body politic
that transforms an amorphous nation into an institutionalized state.
Therefore, the voluntary character should be all the more respected in
determining nationality in the process of self-determination.
Third, territorial residence is still important today so long as it gives
a significant substantive basis for the existence of a nation (or, accord-
ing to the recent terminology in international law, a people), which is
the basic unit of self-determination. The minority view fails to see this
point. Residing in a territory generally can be construed as an expres-
sion of one's voluntary will to be a member of the body politic estab-
lished therein. This presumptive function is a major raison d'etre of the
principle of automatic change today. In order to assume the existence
of a state which is competent to determine its nationals, there must be a
political entity which transforms itself from an amorphous nation into
an institutionalized state. Because such a political entity cannot exist
without people and territory, it follows that a people within the terri-
tory be presumed as a basic unit of the emerging state. The minority
view cannot explain how a state, which is allegedly solely competent to
determine its nationals by domestic laws, can exist without presuppos-
ing the existence of nationals, which is an essential component of a
state. This pre-existence is possible only when the presumptive force of
the principle of automatic change is recognized. Because this principle
has such a presumptive force, it can also be characterized as a supple-
mentary norm in the absence of concete provisions, and as an interpre-
tative principle when the interpretation of a provision is in question.
On the other hand, it is clear that the principle of automatic change
is not of a peremptory, but of a dispositive character. Parties can settle
a nationality problem in a different way (e.g., inhabitants of the trans-
ferred territory will retain the former nationality) by means of a treaty.
Even after World War II, there was still a considerable number of cases
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in which nationality problems accompanying territorial change were
not settled by merely combining domestic nationality laws, but by trea-
ties. These cases also were decided mainly by considering what settle-
ment was most appropriate for the realization of the self-determination
of the people concerned. 97
Thus, the concept of national self-determination constitues the most
important framework within which contemporary nationality problems
accompanying territorial change has been approached, judged, and set-
tled. Both the domestic nationality laws of the states involved in terri-
torial change, stressed under the minority view, and the principle of
automatic change, maintained under the majority view, should ulti-
mately be understood and qualified within the framework of national
self-determination.
B. Nationality Settlement Within the Framework of Human Rights
Nationality has been understood mainly as a link between an indi-
vidual and a state, and has been traditionally considered in a different
dimension from that of human rights. Because the acquisition of na-
tionality by birth has been the basic form of acquiring nationality, the
voluntary will has been inevitably fictitious in positive law. In many
countries, the notion of nationality retained the concept of allegiance, a
remnant of the allegiance to a monarch.
However, due to the growing emphasis on volition in the determina-
tion of nationality in general, and the continued emphasis on the right
of expatriation by the United States in particular, the concept of alle-
giance has gradually declined. The Hague Convention and Protocols
97. The case of Indonesia's attaining independence from the Netherlands offers a good
example. Indonesia declared independence in August 1945, and enacted the Nationality
Law in 1946, Act No. 3 of Apr. 10, 1946, thereby defining the nationals of the Republic of
Indonesia. The Netherlands recognized its independence in November 1949. They con-
cluded the Treaty Concerning the Assignment of Citizens of 1949, 69 U.N.T.S. 206, to deter-
mine whether former Netherlands nationals were to be assigned Netherlands or Indonesian
nationality. The major criterion adopted in the Treaty was an ethnic one. Former Nether-
lands subjects who were not Netherlanders would acquire Indonesian nationality, if they
belonged to the indigenous population of Indonesia (article 4). Those who ethnically be-
longed to Netherlands would retain Netherlands nationality (article 3). Those who be-
longed to neither of the above would acquire Indonesian nationality if they had been born in
Indonesia or had resided there (article 5).
This basic assignment was modified by the introduction of a right of option granted on the
basis of birth and residence. For example, those belonging to the indigenous population
could opt for Netherlands nationality if they were born and resided outside of Indonesia
(article 4). Likewise, those belonging to the Netherlands and those belonging neither to the
Netherlands nor the indigenous population were granted a right of option, provided they
satisfied certain requirements concerning birth or residence (articles 3, 5, 6, 7). Thus, the
demand for the unity of a nation in the ethnic sense, and the respect for the voluntary will of
individuals are two decisive factors in the assignment of people among the states concerned.
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and the Montevideo Conventions on Nationality, which were con-
cluded in the inter-war period, included many provisions for the pro-
tection of human rights, such as the guarantee of nationality of wives
and children, the respect for the will of wives in acquisition and loss of
nationality, the equality of sex as regards nationality, and the preven-
tion of dual nationality and dual military obligation.98 These provi-
sions, together with treaties protecting minorities and judgments of
courts emphasizing the importance of the voluntary will and lives of
individuals, reflect the general trend toward protection of human rights
in the context of nationality during this period.
This trend is even more apparent after World War II. The Univer-
sial Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provides that everyone has a
right to nationality (Article 15). 99 Similar provisions appear in Article
20 of the American Convention on Human Rights (1969),l0 and Arti-
cle 24(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(1966).101 The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons
(1954) and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (1961)
have further promoted this trend.10 2
Domestic legislation after World War II also indicates increased con-
cern for human rights in matters of nationality. Symbolically, the
United Kingdom, which had adhered to the doctrine of nemo potest
exuere patriam, expressly recognized the right of expatriation in the
1948 Nationality Act. With the persistent insistence on the equality of
sex by socialist countries and the development of the idea of non-dis-
crimination, many countries have at least reduced the degree of ine-
quality in their nationality legislation in favor of women. 103
Supplementary application ofjus soli in many nationality laws based
onjus sanguinis, as well as technical devices preventing the occurrence
98. See the Hague Convention, supra note 6, arts. 6, 8-10, 13-17, U.N. LEG. S.: LAWS
CONCERNING NATIONALITY U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/4 at 567-69; Protocol Relating to
Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Dual Nationality of Apr. 12, 1930, art. 1, Id at 572;
Protocol Relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness of Apr. 12, 1930, art. 1, Id at 575;
Convention on the Nationality of Women of Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, id at 584; Convention on
Nationality of Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 4-5, id at 585.
99. BASIC DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 32 (L.
Sohn & T. Buergenthal eds. 1973).
100. Id. at 217.
101. Id. at 53. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [hereinafter
cited as 1966 (B) Covenant] provides this idea in the form of the right of a child to acquire a
nationality.
102. HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 66-75 (J. Joyce ed. 1978).
103. Many European countries which had ajussanguinis apalre nationality law, such as
France, West Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden have revised it, and have
adoptedjus sanguinis based on the equality of sex. Japan has just begun reviewing its na-
tionality law in the same direction.
Vol. 8:1, 1981
Nationality Change
of statelessness in cases of marriage in many contemporary nationality
laws show the common concern to avoid statelessness.' °4 These char-
acteristics indicate that the concept of human rights offers a basic
framework for approaching and settling the problem of nationality.
Measures taken by states concerning change of nationality related to
territorial change exemplify the above trend. For example, as men-
tioned earlier, the United Kingdom and France took radical measures
so that no one would become stateless. Most of those who had more
than one possible link supporting their nationality were given a defjure
or defacto right of option. Many cases of independence or transfer of
territory from the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, the
Netherlands and the United States show respect for the voluntary will
of individuals and actual life in a territory. Although these settlements
did not explicitly refer to "human rights," it is clear that they were
implicitly guided by references to human rights, inter alia: (1) preven-
tion of statelessness; (2) respect for equality of sex in acquiring and
declining nationality; (3) respect for the free and voluntary will; and
(4) respect for the actual life in a territory.
The above shows the concern for human rights which can be seen in
nationality settlements since World War II. There is another human
rights consideration which has a prescriptive meaning for nationality
settlements related to territorial change, although it has developed in-
dependently from them. This is the concept of non-discrimination on
the basis of nationality that has been rapidly emerging in international
as well as domestic practice.
As shown in Section II, many countries adopted non-residential cri-
teria such as race, birth, etc. for settling nationality problems accompa-
nying territorial change. This resulted in a considerable alien
population within a territory. Although the alien population differs
from the majority of the population in nationality, it does not differ in
its membership and participation in the community, nor in its societal
obligations. Therefore, it is necessary to grasp the current situation of
non-discrimination norms concerning nationality, although this aspect
of human rights law has not been sufficiently considered in the nation-
ality settlement relating to territorial change.10 5
104. See Lagarde, La rnovation du Code de la Nationalitupar la loidu 9janvier 1973, 62
REvUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRrvA 431 (1973); McDougal, Lasswell &
Chen, Nationality and Human Rights: The Protection of Individual in External Areas, 83
YALE L.J. 900, 965-76 (1974); Mttnch, Development rcents du droit de la nationalitM, in 2
STUDI IN ONORE DI MANLIO UDINA 1.109, 1123, 1127-29, 1131-35 (1975).
105. The major reason for this insufficiency is the excessive emphasis on the concept of
national self-determination on the part of the nations attaining independence. The concern
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In the pre-World War II era, the protection of the rights of individu-
als was restricted by its national character in that: (1) protection was
under a dualistic regime of rights of nationals and rights of aliens;
(2) protection of rights of nationals was limited to local (domestic) rem-
edies; and (3) protection of rights of aliens was, through the system of
diplomatic protection, left to the discretion of the aliens'
governments.10 6
In contrast, the development of the international protection of
human rights after World War II transcends the traditional dualistic
regime in the following respects. First, the law of human rights defines
rights of individuals basically as universal human rights. In concrete
terms, international human rights instruments express the universality
of the enjoyment of human rights by generally providing either: "Eve-
ryone has (or shall have) the right to. . ."; or "No one shall be.. .";
or, even more explicitly, "Everyone (or all individuals) within (or sub-
ject to) its jurisdiction."10 7 When the term "everyone" is used in the
exceptional sense of designating a national, it is made clear from the
context of the sentence.'08
Second, certain instruments such as the European Convention on
Human Rights and the International Labour Organization (I.L.O.) pro-
vide various measures to give effect to the universality of the enjoyment
of human rights. The right to petition by individuals as well as con-
tracting states in general, the competence of the European Commission
of Human Rights to bring a case before the European Court of Human
Rights, the right to challenge a governmental measure by representa-
tives of workers or employers, and the various enforcement actions
taken by the I.L.O. exemplify some of these measures. 10 9 Although the
degree of enforcement varies widely, these measures attempt to over-
come the dualistic regime in that: (1) an individuals can complain at
the international level regarding the violation of his rights by his own
government; (2) he can complain regarding the violation of his rights
for the protection of human rights of those who became aliens as a result of independence, if
any, was almost exclusively seen in the former metropolitan states.
106. The diplomatic protection has been framed by its national character in that: (1) an
individual can expect remedies only through the protection of his state of nationality; (2) the
right of protection has been understood as a right of the state, not of the individual.
107. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 7-9, BAsic DOCUMENTS,
supra note 99, at 30-34; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedom of 4 November 1950, arts. 1-5, id at 125-40; 1966 (B) Covenant,
supra note 101, arts. 7-9, id at 44-62.
108. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21, supra note 107, at 33.
109. As to the activities and achievements of these human rights mechanisms, see E.
LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY YEARS OF I.L.O.
EXPERIENCE (1966); FJACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1975).
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by a foreign state, without relying on the diplomatic protection of his
own government; and (3) not only the state whose national's right is
violated, but also the contracting states in general, -as well as an inter-
national commission, can bring a violation of human rights by a certain
state before an international tribunal.
Finally, emerging norms of non-discrimination 1 ° produce a certain
impact on the traditional dualistic regime. Although the norm against
discrimination based on nationality is the least developed of non-dis-
crimination norms, this does not mean that international law generally
allows discrimination based on nationality. Theoretically, the univer-
sality of the enjoyment of human rights requires its general prohibition.
Although many lists of prohibited grounds for discrimination in human
rights instruments do not enumerate nationality, they are non-exclusive
in nature, and are not intended to validate other forms of discrimina-
tion. When these instruments allow distinctions between nationals and
aliens, they explicitly limit them to certain specified conditions, thereby
indicating their exceptional character. 1 '
II0. With the advent of decolonization, the notion of white supremeacy as justification
for racial discrimination has been effectively defeated. The norm of non-discrimination on
the basis of race is being established in every political, economic, social, and cultural area.
Led by this development, non-discrimination norms in various fields also are gradually be-
ing established.
On the international level, almost all international instruments of a general character such
as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 2(1), the 1966 (A) Covenant, art. 2(2),
and the 1966 (B) Covenant, art. 2(1), as well as regional instruments on human rights, such
as the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 14, and the American Convention on
Human Rights, art. 1, include a general principle of non-discrimination. In concrete areas,
conventions such as the Equal Remuneration Convention of 1951 (art. 2), the Discrimina-
tion (Employment and Occupation) Convention of 1958 (arts. 1, 2) and the Convention
against Discrimination in Education of 1960 (arts. 1, 3) prohibit discrimination on the
various bases in their respective fields. Furthermore, conventions prohibiting discrimination
based on certain particular grounds, such as the Convention on the Political Rights of Wo-
men of 1952, the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women, the Conventions on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1965 and that of Discrimination
against Women of 1980 have been adopted and aid in the formation of more inclusive
norms of non-discrimination. The accumulation of U.N. practice judging apartheid as ille-
gal, and the continuing activities of the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities have also contributed to the establishment of norms of
non-discrimination.
111. This is evidenced by the entire terminology of the provisions, as well as the Iravaux
preparatoires. For example, although the 1966 (A) Covenant does not enumerate national-
ity as one of the prohibited grounds, this does not mean that it generally allows discrimina-
tion based on nationality. Had the 1966 (A) Covenant allowed for discrimination, it would
have been unncessasry to provide for Article 2(3), which allows only that "[dieveloping
countries... may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights rec-
ognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals." 1966 (A) Covenant, art. 2(3). Nor
would Western European states have been against the adoption of Article 2(3), claiming that
it was contrary to the spirit of the universality and equality underlying the Covenant. Thus,
the fact that Article 2(3) was inserted indicates the general prohibition against discrimina-
tion based on nationality and the exceptional allowance for certain limited areas. See U.N.
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In this way, the significance of nationality as a criterion governing
value distributions among individuals has been decreasing. Instead, re-
siding in a certain territorial community and being subject to its territo-
rial jurisdiction have become more and more significant, as shown in
Article 2(1) of the 1966 (B) Covenant. Exemplary in this respect is the
Declaration on the Protection of Human Rights of Resident Aliens
drafted by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities.1 12 The draft declaration, supported by many
governments, emphasizes the rights of resident aliens. It limits its scope
to the aliens who live for a certain period of time within a community,
thereby guaranteeing not only political and civil rights but also eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights to them. 1 3 Since the draft has been
prepared on the basis of existing international provisions for the protec-
tion of human rights, this feature can be characterized as a reflection of
current international norms of non-discrimination relating to
nationality.
The same characteristic can be seen in recent domestic trends. Here
again, aithoiih'less developed than other norms of non-discrimination,
a general prohibition of discrimination based on nationality is being
established. Although the British Race Relations Act originally did not
specify nationality as a basis for non-discrimination, it explicitly came
to prohibit discrimination based on nationality in 1976.114 The report
to the French National Assembly made it clear that the term "national-
irk" enumerated as a basis for non-discrimination in the Anti-Racism
Law included nationality in the legal sense." l5 In the United States, the
Supreme Court held in Graham v. Richardson 16 that classifications
GAOR C.3 Annex (Agenda Item 43), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1181-85, 1202-07 (1962). See
also McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, The Protection ofAliensfrom Discrimination and World
Public Order: Responsibility ofStates Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 432,
457 n. 100 (1976).
112. Draft Declaration ofthe Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Citizens ofthe
Country in Which They Live (Revised), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1336 (1978). See also, The Prob-
lem ofthe Applicability ofExistinglnternationalProvisionsfor the Protection ofHuman Rights
o/Individuals Who Are Not Citizens ofthe Country in Which They Live, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/335 (1973); Report Prepared by Baroness Elles, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.628 &
Add. 1-3 (1975).
113. Revised Draft Declaration Prepared by Baroness Elles, arts. 1, 4-10, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/L.682 (1978); Draft Declaration, preamble and art. 1, supra, note 101 at 2. See
also, Questions of International Protection ofthe Human Rights ofIndividuals Who Are Not
Citizens of the Country in Which They Live: Comments Received from Governments, E/
CN.4/1354 (1979), Add. 1-5 (1979-1980).
114. The Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74, § l(1)(b)(ii), § 78(I), 46 HALSBURY'S STAT. 396,
455 (1976).
115. J. Off. Report No. 2357, Ass. Nat., Annex Oral Hearing of May 25, 1972 session, at
15. Cf Law No. 72-546 regarding the fight against racism, J. Off. (Fr.) July 2, 1972, at 6803.
116. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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based on alienage are inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial
scrutiny. 117 Since then, it has held various state laws and regulations
requiring citizenship or restricting eligibility of aliens to be unconstitu-
tional, except in certain limited areas."1 In Japan, although Korean
residents initially were not permitted to enter the Legal Training and
Research Institute because of their alien status, finally they were admit-
ted and now may practice law as resident alien advocates." 9 Like the
international trend, these domestic developments stress the significance
of residence and membership in a community. In this regard, the U.S.
Supreme Court properly pointed out the equality of the burdens and
contributions of resident aliens and citizens in a society.' 20 Even the
British Immigration Act of 1971,121 that has been severely criticized for
restricting coloured immigrants, provides for exemption from deporta-
tion for Commonwealth citizens who were ordinarily resident in the
United Kingdom when the Act came into force.
It is, therefore, evident that territorial residence is still important in
guaranteeing rights of individuals, even though its status as a basis for
nationality related to territorial change has weakened. This can be ex-
plained in the following way. It has been believed that nationality
should be based on the free and voluntary will of individuals. On the
other hand, since acquisition by birth has been a major form of acquir-
ing nationality, free and voluntary will has to be fictionalized. In order
that the acquisition of nationality containing this fiction be generally
accepted, a more substantive link between individuals and a state is
necessary. Residing in a territorial community as a member of society
thereof constitutes this substantive link. Because the overwhelming
majority of people are brought up in and establish various concrete
relations within the territorial community of a state, they acquire a nat-
ural consciousness of linkage to the state. Thus, it is not nationality,
which is inherently fictitious in character, but the substantive facts of
residence and societal life that actually support the link between indi-
viduals and a state. For the overwhelming majority of people, how-
117. Id. at 376.
118. Sugarman v. Dougali, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973);
Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); Nyquist v. Mauclet,
432 U.S. 1 (1977); Exceptions-Foley v. Connelie, 431 U.S. 291 (1978) (citizenship permissi-
ble qualification for state police employment); Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (citi-
zenship permissible qualification for certification for public school teacher).
119. Exparte Kim Kyong-duk (1977). See SHIHOSHUSHUSESI-BENGOSHI TO
KOKUSEKI (Legal Apprentice-Advocate and Nationality) (S. Harago & H. Tanaka eds.
1977).
120. 403 U.S. at 376; Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645 (1973).
121. The Immigration Act, 1971, ch. 77, § 7, 41 HALSBURY'S STAT. 27-28 (1971).
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ever, residing as members of a territorial community coincided with
being nationals of a state governing the territory. Therefore, to limit
sharing in the common values of the community to nationals of the
state did not cause serious problems.
The contemporary world differs from the above. First, as was shown
earlier, many newly independent states do not regard territorial resi-
dence as a sufficient basis for nationality. Second, with the constant
increase of foreign immigrant laborers, the number of resident aliens
has increased remarkably. Due to these factors, the gap between being
a national and being an inhabitant is no longer negligible. Finally, the
development of human rights weakens the traditional nationalistic
framework for the protection of rights. Thus, the limitation based on
nationality reveals its fictitious character. Although certain areas still
remain where the limitation is permissible, it must be made clear that,
in principle, everyone subject to territorial jurisdiction shall enjoy
human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights.
Conclusion
From the foregoing analysis-historical as well as theoretical-it is
now evident that there has been a fundamental change in the frame-
work governing the change of nationality accompanying territorial
change. The principle of automatic change has now lost the axiomatic
character that it once had. The overwhelming majority of post-war na-
tionality problems accompanying territorial change were solved by the
domestic laws of both the states involved, which did not necessarily
assume the automatic change of the nationality of the inhabitants.
Rather, it was assumed that the states involved, especially the newly
independent states, were free to adopt legislative criteria which they
deemed proper in determining who would be their nationals.
This does not, however, indicate the victory of the minority view,
which merely emphasizes the importance of a domestic nationality law.
Not only does the minority view disregard concern for human rights,
but also it cannot.escape the logical fallacy shown earlier. Thus, it is of
utmost importance to recognize that post-war nationality problems
were framed and settled by considering what type of settlement would
be most appropriate for the realization of the self-determination of the
people involved. The framework of national self-determination has
been substituted for the framework of appurtenance theory, still implic-
itly surviving even after the era of bourgeois revolution.
Although the concept of national self-determination constitutes the
basic framework for nationality settlements related to territorial
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change, it is not the only existing framework. One can see the bare
beginning of an increasing concern for human rights in settling post-
World War II nationality problems. First, by the very nature of the
concept of self-determination, the free and voluntary will of individuals
should be respected, and is respected in concrete post-war legislation
and court decisions. Second, concern for avoiding statelessness and
conferring of dejure and defacto options to those affected by national-
ity change after World War II indicates sincere attempts to protect in-
dividuals from excessive emphasis on national self-determination.
Third, because contemporary human rights law has established non-
discrimination norms in the field of nationality as well as in the fields
of race, sex, etc., the rights of those residents who become aliens as a
result of territorial change should be protected as much as possible.
Although these concerns, especially the latter, have not been fully real-
ized in post-World War II nationality settlements, a human rights
framework that includes these concerns is emerging which guides and
proscribes decision-makers in approaching and settling nationality
problems. In this way, national self-determination and concern for
human rights constitute the contemporary framework for settlement of
nationality problems accompanying territorial change.
